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WALTON v. ARIZONA: THE CONFUSION
SURROUNDING THE SENTENCING OF
CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
CONTINUES
When Congress adopted the eighth amendment' to the United States Con-
stitution in 1791, all states, in accordance with the common law, automati-
cally imposed a death sentence upon defendants convicted of murder.2
Although state death penalty laws were clear, juries were generally unwilling
to support mandatory capital punishment.' Thus, rather than returning ver-
dicts that would necessarily result in death, juries would often find defend-
ants not guilty, or guilty of lesser crimes.4 Accordingly, state legislatures
began to narrow the types of offenses deemed capital.5 Unmoved by the
legislatures' efforts, jurors continued to refuse to return guilty verdicts where
death was the automatic punishment.6 In response to jury behavior, states,
instead of further limiting the types of capital crimes, allowed juries un-
guided and unrestrained discretion to determine the type of punishment a
defendant in a capital case would receive.7
Prior to 1972, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument
that discretionary death penalty sentencing violated the due process clause
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This Note focuses on the procedural
aspects of capital punishment only. Whether the death penalty, in and of itself, violates the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the eighth amendment is beyond the scope of this
Note.
2. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976). At the time of the American
Revolution, all persons convicted of crimes such as murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, rob-
bery, burglary, or sodomy were generally sentenced to death. 1di; see THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA 6-9 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982).
3. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289 (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-99
(1971)).
4. See, e.g., id at 290. The threat of "jury nullification," whereby juries took the law
into their own hands, led the states to develop an alternative to mandatory death sentences.
McGautha 402 U.S. at 199 (noting that states had met the problem of jury nullification by
openly "granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact"); THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 10.
5. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289-90 (citing McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198-99).
6. Id. at 291 (citing McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199).
7. Id. at 291-92 (finding that all states which allowed capital punishment had replaced
automatic death penalty statutes with discretionary jury sentencing by 1963); McGautha, 402
U.S. at 200 n.ll.
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of the fourteenth amendment.8 In Furman v. Georgia,9 however, three Jus-
tices, two of whose views later became the constitutional mandate of
Furman, 10 generally found that "untrammeled [sentencer] discretion""' cre-
ated a substantial risk that the sentencer would impose the death penalty
arbitrarily, denying a defendant the constitutional right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. 2 Thus, Furman
stands for the principle that, for a death sentence to be constitutional, the
sentencer's discretion to impose death must be statutorily directed. 3 The
Furman Court's goal was to avoid arbitrary sentencing by requiring the
states to establish specific statutory standards to guide the sentencer's deci-
sion-making process in capital cases.' 4 The Court reasoned that statutory
standards would bring about uniformity in the application of capital punish-
ment to comport with the eighth amendment's prohibition.'"
In 1978, the Supreme Court added a second constitutional requirement to
capital punishment determinations in Lockett v. Ohio. 6 The Lockett Court
held that the legislature may not preclude the sentencer from considering, as
a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
8. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207-08. The McGautha Court found that granting the sen-
tencer untrammeled discretion to impose death or life imprisonment did not violate the Consti-
tution, reasoning that states were entitled to assume that "jurors confronted with the truly
awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human [would] act with due regard for
the consequences of their decision." Id at 208. Moreover, the Court found that it was not
possible "to identify before the fact those homicides for which the slayer should die." Id at
197.
9. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
10. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976). "Furman mandates that where dis-
cretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Id; see also infra text
accompanying notes 73-76.
11. Furman, 408 U.S. at 248.
12. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id at
313-14 (White, J., concurring).
13. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987) ("the State must establish rational
criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment"); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541
(1987) ("death penalty statutes [must] be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being
administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion") (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Furman
408 U.S. 238).
14. Currently, the presence of one legislatively defined aggravating circumstance is re-
quired before a judge or jury can impose a death sentence. Special Project, Capital Punishment
In 1984: Abandoning The Pursuit Of Fairness And Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1129,
1137 (1984).
15. See id. at 1135 (noting that Furman and the cases following it "indicated that the level
of sentencing discretion in capital cases must be suitably directed and limited so as to produce
fair and reasonably consistent results"); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
16. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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of the circumstances of the offense proffered by the defendant as a basis for a
lesser sentence than death. 7 Thus, Furman and Lockett present the sen-
tencing authority with two conflicting principles to consider when deciding
between life imprisonment or death. Furman stands for the proposition that
the sentencer's discretion to impose death must be statutorily guided to pre-
vent arbitrary sentencing." Alternatively, Lockett prevents defendants
guilty of the same crime from receiving uniform treatment 9 by allowing the
sentencer discretion to decide whether any factors relating to the defendant
or the crime show that the defendant does not" 'deserve to be [sentenced] to
death.' "2o Although the Furman and Lockett principles are contradictory,
the Court has failed to reconcile them.2 Walton v. Arizona22 presented the
United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve the Furman-
Lockett conflict. The Walton Court, however, failed to recognize the
Furman-Lockett conflict as the underlying issue. Rather, the Court ex-
amined Arizona's death penalty statute merely to determine whether it satis-
fied eighth and fourteenth amendment capital punishment jurisprudence.23
In February of 1989, an Arizona jury tried and convicted Jeffrey Walton
for the first degree murder of Thomas Powell.24 The jury determined that
Walton and his two codefendants, Hoover and Ramsey, went to a bar in-
tending to rob someone at random, steal his car, and then leave him in the
17. Id. at 604. In a footnote, however, the Court implied that mandatory death sentences
may still be justifiable to deter certain kinds of homicide, such as murder committed by a
prisoner or escapee under a life sentence. Id n. 11; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633,
637 n.5 (1977) (leaving open the issue of under what circumstances mandatory capital punish-
ment statutes may be applied to inmates serving life sentences). The Lockett Court noted that
"[n]othing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant,
evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his
offense." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12.
18. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988); supra text accompanying notes 9-
15.
19. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3062 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); supra text
accompanying notes 16-17.
20. Id at 3063 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2950 (1989)); see Lockett, 438
U.S. at 604-05.
21. See Special Project, supra note 14, at 1162. "As the number of factors that the sen-
tencing authority may consider increases, guided discretion becomes a more difficult goal to
attain." Id
22. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
23. Id at 3054-58. In Walton, a five member majority voted to uphold the Arizona
Supreme Court. Id. at 3058. Justice White wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. Five separate opinions were filed in the decision. Id
at 3051.
24. State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 576, 769 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 3047
(1990) (en banc).
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desert while they fled the state." The three robbed Powell at gunpoint and
forced him into his car, which they then drove into the Arizona desert.26
Ramsey promised Powell that he would not be hurt.27 After Walton and
Hoover debated over Powell's fate, Walton marched Powell into the desert
and shot him.2" When Walton was arrested a week later, he led police to the
murder site, where they found Powell's body.29 A medical examiner deter-
mined that Powell had been blinded and rendered unconscious by the shot,
but was not immediately killed.30 Instead, Powell regained consciousness,
floundered about in the desert, and ultimately died approximately one day
before his body was found.3
After an Arizona jury found Walton guilty of first degree murder,32 he
was sentenced in a separate hearing by a judge, as required by Arizona




27. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3052 (1990).




32. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (1989 & Supp. 1990). The statute provides
that "[a] person commits first degree murder if: [i]ntending or knowing that his conduct will
cause death, such person causes the death of another with premeditation," or if in the course of
committing certain specified offenses and without any mental state other than what is required
for the commission of such offenses, he causes the death of any person. Id
33. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3051 (1990). Section 13-703(B) of the Arizona
murder statute provides as follows:
When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder as defined
in § 13-1105, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was
entered, or any other judge in the event of the death, resignation, incapacity or dis-
qualification of the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was
entered, shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or
nonexistence of the circumstances included in subsections F and G of this section, for
the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed. The hearing shall be con-
ducted before the court alone.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
34. Aggravating factors are those facts about the defendant's record or the offense that
weigh in favor of imposing the death penalty. Section 13-703(F) of the Arizona Criminal Code
provides that the aggravating circumstances to be considered are:
1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for
which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.
2. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the United States involv-
ing the use or threat of violence on another person.
3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person or persons in addition to the victim of the offense.
4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise
of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
(Vol. 40:475
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and mitigating" circumstances and is required to impose a death sentence if
he finds one or more enumerated aggravating circumstances and "no miti-
gating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." '36 The
prosecution bears the burden of establishing aggravating circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt, while the defendant bears the burden of proving
mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. 31 At the hearing, the
judge found that Walton had shot Powell and that two of the statutorily
delineated aggravating circumstances--that the defendant had committed
the offense in "an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,, 3' and that
5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in ex-
pectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner.
7. The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of the state depart-
ment of corrections, a law enforcement agency or county or city jail.
8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in
§ 13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the offense.
9. The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was tried as
an adult and the victim was under fifteen years of age.
10. The murdered individual was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the
course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew, or should have
known, that the victim was a peace officer.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (emphasis added).
35. Mitigating factors are those aspects of a defendant's character, background, record,
offense, or any other circumstances proffered by the defendant that might serve as a basis for
reducing the sentence, even though they do not constitute an excuse or justification for the
crime. Section 13-703(G) provides that:
Mitigating circumstances shall be any factors proffered by the defendant or the state
which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death,
including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense, including but not limited to the following:
1. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so
impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such as to
constitute a defense to prosecution.
3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under the pro-
visions of § 13-303, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor
as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
4. The defendant could not reasonably have forseen that his conduct in the course
of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted would cause,
or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
5. The defendant's age.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G).
36. Id § 13-703(E).
37. Id. § 13-703(C); see State v. McMurtrey, 143 Ariz. 71, 72-73, 691 P.2d 1099, 1100-01
(1984) (en banc).
38. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6).
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he had done so for pecuniary gain-were present. 9 Then, after considering
all of the mitigating factors urged by defense counsel, the court concluded
that there were "no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency. '
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Walton's conviction and
death sentence.4' Among other claims,"2 the court rejected Walton's con-
tention that the statute failed to guide the sentencer's decision-making be-
cause the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance
language under Section 13-703(F) of the Arizona Criminal Code43 was un-
constitutionally vague.' The court also denied that the preponderance of
the evidence standard for mitigating factors improperly limited the sen-
tencer's discretion.4" In Adamson v. Ricketts,"6 a case decided two months
earlier, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional for precisely these
39. State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 586, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
3047 (1990) (en banc). Walton told Hoover and Ramsey that he had shot Powell and that he
had "'never seen a man pee in his pants before.'" Id at 587, 769 P.2d at 1033. The Court
found that Walton's reference to Powell's urinating on himself indicated Walton's "callous
fascination with the murder," his "indifference to the suffering of the victim and... [his] sense
of pleasure... in the killing." Id
40. Id at 588, 769 P.2d at 1034. The Court found that neither Walton's age, his pur-
ported lack of appreciation for the wrongfulness of his conduct, nor his claimed inability to
foresee the consequences of his actions were mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to
warrant leniency. Id at 588-89, 769 P.2d at 1034-35.
41. Id at 592, 769 P.2d at 1038.
42. Walton argued that Arizona's death penalty procedure was unconstitutional for sev-
eral other reasons: it was facially invalid as cruel and unusual punishment; it allowed a judge,
rather than a jury, to prescribe the sentence; it did not require the state to prove that aggravat-
ing factors outweighed mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; it did not provide suffi-
cient standards to determine how much weight should be given to the factors; it restricted the
judge's discretion by requiring that a death sentence be imposed where certain findings were
made; and it did not require the judge to enter a "special verdict" explaining his findings. Id.
at 584, 769 P.2d at 1030.
43. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F); supra note 34.
44. Walton, 159 Ariz. at 584-85, 769 P.2d at 1030-31. The Arizona Supreme Court deter-
mined that Arizona's courts had provided the sentencer with sufficient guidance by limiting
the reach of the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance through
narrow constructions of the statute's language. Id. at 586-88, 769 P.2d at 1032-34. For exam-
ple, the court noted that "a crime is committed in an especially cruel manner when the perpe-
trator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death." Id at 586, 769 P.2d
at 1032 (citing State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 479-80, 715 P.2d 721, 733 (1986) (en banc);
State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (en banc), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971 (1983)).
In addition, the court stated "a crime is committed in an especially depraved manner when the
perpetrator relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion." Id. at 587, 769 P.2d at
1033 (citing Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51-52, 659 P.2d at 10-11).
45. Id at 584-85, 769 P.2d at 1030-31 (citing Correll, 148 Ariz. at 483-84, 715 P.2d at
736-37).
46. 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3287 (1990).
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reasons.47 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict between the two lower courts.
48
In Walton v. Arizona,49 Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded
that the Arizona death penalty statute was constitutional,' ° without con-
fronting the Furman-Lockett tension.51 The Court maintained that although
the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance lan-
guage of the Arizona criminal code might be vague on its face,52 it was not
constitutionally deficient under Furman because the Arizona Supreme Court
had narrowed the language of the statute to guide the sentencer suffi-
ciently.5 3 In addition, the majority held that requiring the defendant to
prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence did not
violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments, because this burden in no
way lightened the State's burden of proving the existence of aggravating cir-
cumstances.54 Finally, the majority contended that, because the Arizona
statute was consistent with Lockett in allowing the court to consider mitigat-
ing circumstances, and did not impose death automatically, it was
constitutional.5
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia directly confronted the Furman-
Lockett conflict,5 6 and declared that he would no longer uphold a challenge
under the eighth amendment that the discretion of the sentencer had been
unconstitutionally restricted. The issue before the Court, Justice Scalia
reasoned, squarely presented the opportunity to resolve the Furman-Lockett
47. Id at 1038 (finding that Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravat-
ing circumstance had "not been given a sufficiently narrow construction by the Arizona
Supreme Court such that its application [would] be kept within identifiable boundaries," and
that the circumstance had been "arbitrarily and capriciously applied by the Arizona courts");
id at 1041 (holding that Arizona courts were "precluded from weighing evidence of mitigation
that, while not satisfying the evidentiary standard, nonetheless may give the sentencer reserva-
tions about the appropriateness of imposing a sentence of death").
48. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989).
49. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
50. Id at 3054-58.
51. Infra notes 56-59.
52. 110 S. Ct. at 3057. "[T]here is no serious argument that Arizona's 'especially heinous,
cruel or depraved' aggravating factor is not facially vague." Id
53. See id at 3057-58. Because the Arizona Supreme Court had narrowed the language of
the statute, the Court found it appropriate to presume that trial judges in Arizona were apply-
ing these more limiting definitions. Id at 3057.
54. Id. at 3055.
55. Id at 3056; accord Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990) (jury instruction
requiring death penalty not impermissibly mandatory); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190
(same) (1990).
56. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3059-68 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
57. Id at 3068.
1991]
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tension. He argued that Lockett's mandate that a sentencer not be precluded
from considering any mitigating factors was irreconcilable with Furman's
requirement that a sentencer's discretion be constrained by specific stan-
dards to ensure consistent application of the death penalty.5" Recognizing
that the Lockett and Furman doctrines were mutually exclusive, Justice
Scalia announced his willingness to sacrifice the former for the latter. 9
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, argued that Arizona's death penalty
statute violated the Constitution for three reasons.' First, by allowing the
sentencer to consider only those mitigating circumstances the defendant
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, Justice Blackmun contended
that the statute necessarily violated Lockett by effectively precluding the sen-
tencer from considering all mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant.' 1
Second, Justice Blackmun argued that the statute operated under an uncon-
stitutional "presumption of death.' 2 Third, he found that the "especially
heinous, cruel or depraved" standard was unconstitutional under Furman
because both the language and its prior judicial application failed to give the
sentencing authority meaningful guidance in deciding who was to live and
who was to die.63
Although Justice Brennan joined in Justice Blackmun's dissent, he also
filed a separate dissenting opinion to accentuate his view that the death pen-
alty is a cruel and unusual punishment that violates the eighth amendment
under all circumstances."4 Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun, but
wrote separately as well to dissent from the Court's holding that it is not
constitutionally necessary for a jury to determine the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances before sentencing the defendant to death.65 Moreover,
Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, arguing that a
rule that forbids unguided discretion in the initial stage of the sentencing
process is entirely consistent with one that requires unlimited discretion in
the final stage, before imposing death.66
58. Id. at 3063.
59. Id. at 3067-68.
60. Id at 3070 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined
in Justice Blackmun's dissent.
61. Id. at 3074.
62. Id at 3075-76 (citing Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1041 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3287 (1990)).
63. See id. at 3076-82.
64. Id at 3068 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's
separate dissent.
65. Id at 3086-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 3092.
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This Note examines the law prior to Walton v. Arizona, demonstrating
how the Supreme Court has tried to develop an objective and consistent cap-
ital punishment scheme, while at the same time attempting to guarantee cap-
ital defendants the right to subjective and individualized sentencing. The
Note then reviews the opinions issued in Walton and ultimately agrees with
Justice Scalia that Furman and Lockett are rationally irreconcilable. This
Note argues that the Supreme Court must reexamine the competing objec-
tives underlying Furman and Lockett in order to give the states more ra-
tional and meaningful guidance regarding the imposition of death sentences.
I. THE ONGOING TUG OF WAR IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Furman v. Georgia's Guided Discretion Through Aggravating
Circumstances
Prior to 1972, jurors generally possessed unrestrained freedom to impose
either the death penalty or life imprisonment in capital cases.6 7 Two of the
opinions supporting the Supreme Court's per curiam judgment in Furman v.
Georgia ,68 however, dramatically changed the status of capital sentencing by
holding that death penalty statutes that failed to guide the sentencer's discre-
tion violated the eighth amendment.69 In Furman, the Court overturned
three death sentences because the statutes under which the men were sen-
tenced gave the jury complete discretion to inflict capital punishment. 7' In a
brief per curiam opinion,71 a majority of five Justices arrived at the narrow
conclusion that a death sentence was unconsitutional in these cases.72 Each
of the Justices comprising the majority wrote a separate opinion, and no two
Justices concurred in any one opinion.73
67. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
68. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
69. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
70. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
71. Id. at 239-40. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall filed separate
opinions in support of the judgments. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist filed separate dissenting opinions. Id at 240.
72. Id. at 239-40.
73. Id. at 240. Justices Brennan and Marshall found that imposing death upon an indi-
vidual violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause under all circumstances and voted to
reverse the defendants' death sentences for that reason alone. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., con-
curring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White re-
fused to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments, but voted to reverse the death sentences for other reasons. See supra notes 74-76
and accompanying text. Justice Douglas' vote rested in part on his finding that the death
penalty was being imposed in a potentially arbitrary way. 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., con-
curring) ("'A penalty . . . should be considered "unusually" imposed if it is administered
arbitrarily or discriminatorily'" (quoting Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring The Death Pen-
alty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1790 (1970))). In addition, Justice Douglas
1991]
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The critical opinions were those of Justices Stewart and White. These
Justices stressed that under the eighth amendment the death penalty could
not be imposed when sentencing procedures lacked sufficient standards be-
cause such procedures created a substantial risk that death would be in-
fficted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unfair manner. Recognizing the
unique finality that results when an individual is executed,74 Justice Stewart
found that capital punishment schemes that allowed the penalty to be im-
posed "wantonly and . .. freakishly"' 75 violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Similarly, Justice White concluded that because capital de-
fendants were being sentenced to death so infrequently, "there [was] no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed
from the many cases in which it [was] not."'76 Thus, Furman appeared to
stand for the proposition that the sentencer's discretion must be statutorily
guided and limited by objective standards in order for capital punishment
schemes to function in a rational and consistent manner, as required by the
eighth amendment. The Supreme Court cases following Furman have inter-
preted the decision in precisely this way.77
Because the Furman decision was supported by so many different ratio-
nales, 78 however, it created confusion among the states as to how the death
penalty could be imposed without violating the eighth amendment. 79 In ef-
fect, Furman invalidated thirty-nine of the forty death penalty statutes effec-
believed that the death penalty was also being administered in a discriminatory manner against
"minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular." Id
at 245.
74. Ir at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
75. Id at 310. "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id at 309. "TIhe petitioners are among a capri-
ciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."
Id at 309-10.
76. Id at 313 (White, J., concurring).
77. For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the principal case following
Furman, the plurality interpreted Furman as mandating that capital sentencing discretion "be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action." Id at 189 (plurality opinion). Moreover, in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988), the Court relied on Furman and its progeny to hold that "channeling and limiting of
the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty (was] a fundamental constitutional
requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Id
at 362.
78. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240; supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978). States had attempted to satisfy
Furman by enacting one of four types of statutes. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutional-
ity of the New Death Penalty Statutes 87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1699 (1974). Some states
created a list of aggravating circumstances and required that at least one must be found before
death could be inflicted. Id Others specified both the aggravating and mitigating factors that
could be considered. Id. Still others mandated death where at least one aggravating factor
and no mitigating factors were found, but refused to allow capital punishment otherwise. Id
[Vol. 40:475
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tive at that time.8 ° Accordingly, state legislatures enacted new statutes that
limited the sentencer's discretion, but still permitted the death penalty for
some crimes that caused a victim to lose his life."1
The Supreme Court upheld Georgia's post-Furman statute in Gregg v.
Georgia, 2 finding that Georgia had satisfied the concerns expressed in
Furman3 by narrowing the class of murderers subject to capital punish-
ment.8 4 After Furman, Georgia amended its statute by specifying ten aggra-
vating circumstances.8 " The statute provided that a jury could not impose a
death sentence unless it had rendered a guilty verdict for first degree murder
and found the existence of at least one of the delineated aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt.8 6 In addition, the statute permitted the
sentencing authority to consider any other appropriate aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances.8 7 The statute further provided that, although the jury
need not find any mitigating circumstances to make a mercy recommenda-
tion, at least one statutory aggravating circumstance had to be found before
death could be imposed. 8
In Gregg, the defendant was sentenced to death under the new statute
after being convicted of robbing and murdering a hitchhiker.8 9 In affirming
at 1699-1700. Finally, some states made death the mandatory punishment for certain specified
crimes. Id at 1700.
80. Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Not only are the capital punish-
ment laws of 39 States and the District of Columbia struck down, but also all those provisions
of the federal statutory structure that permit the death penalty apparently are voided."). Id
81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
83. Id at 195; see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
84. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
85. 1973 Ga. Laws 173 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1990));
see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165-66 n.9 (listing Georgia's statutory aggravating circumstances in the
year 1976).
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (1990).
The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate... the aggravat-
ing circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In
nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of treason or
aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enu-
merated in subsection (b) of this Code section is so found, the death penalty shall not
be imposed.
Id
87. Id. § 17-10-30(b).
In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the
judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to con-
sider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise author-
ized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances ....
Id (emphasis added).
88. Id. § 17-10-30(b), (c).
89. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158-61.
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Gregg's death sentence, the Court, mirroring Furman, held that statutes that
provided the sentencer with adequate information and guidance alleviated
the danger of arbitrary and capricious death sentences.9 Because Georgia's
statute confined and directed the jury's attention to the circumstances of the
particular crime and to the characteristics of the person who committed the
crime, the Court concluded that Georgia's statute satisfied Furman's goal of
measured, consistent, and fair application of the death penalty.9
The Supreme Court also upheld Florida's post-Furman death penalty stat-
ute in Proffitt v. Florida,92 finding it similar to the Georgia statute upheld in
Gregg. 93 In Proffitt, the defendant was sentenced to death after being con-
victed of the first degree murder of a man sleeping in the home that the
defendant had broken into to commit burglary.94 Under Florida's scheme, if
a defendant were found guilty of a capital offense, a separate sentencing
hearing would be held before the jury and trial judge.95 The defense could
proffer evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances at that hear-
ing." In Proffitt, the jury had to consider whether mitigating circumstances
of the crime and the defendant's character outweighed aggravating circum-
stances to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to life im-
prisonment or death.97 The jury's verdict, however, was only advisory.9a
Unlike Georgia's statute, the trial judge determined the actual sentence
under Florida law.99 The trial judge also had to weigh the aggravating fac-
tors against the mitigating factors before determining whether death was an
90. Id at 195.
91. Id at 198. The Court also noted, however, that each capital sentencing scheme must
be examined individually before it could be found to uphold Furman. Id at 195. Thus, merely
enacting a statute similar to Georgia's would not guarantee a state that its construction was
constitutional. Likewise, a state's adoption of a different type of procedure would not auto-
matically be struck down. Id.
92. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
93. Id at 251-53.
94. Id. at 244-47.
95. Id. at 248; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 1976-1977) (current version at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 1985)).
96. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1). Although the statute con-
tained a list of mitigating factors, six justices approved the statute based on their assumption
that the list was not exclusive. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, who comprised the plu-
rality, noted that the list was not exclusive because although the Florida statute "provide[d]
that '[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to ... [eight specified factors],' ... (t]here
[was] no such limiting language introducing the list of statutory mitigating factors." Proffitt,
428 U.S. at 250 n.8 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see FLA. STAT ANN. §§ 921.141
(5),(6). Justice White, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist accepted the plurality's
interpretation of the statute. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260.
97. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(b)-(c).
98. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-49; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3).
99. Profitt, 428 U.S. at 249.
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appropriate punishment in a particular case.l" ° Finding that the trial judge
in Florida, like the jury in Georgia, was required to focus on the character of
the offender and the characteristics of the crime before imposing a death
sentence,1"' the United States Supreme Court held that Florida's statute was
constitutional under Furman and affirmed."0 2
States such as Georgia and Florida interpreted the Furman decision to
require the creation of additional standards to guide the sentencing deci-
sion. 10 3 Other states, however, believed that Furman prescribed elimination
of all discretion from the capital sentencing process." 4 Accordingly, some
100. Id. at 251.
101. Id. at 251-52.
102. Id. at 259-60. The Supreme Court also upheld the Texas death penalty statute in
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), even though the statute did not explicitly mention aggra-
vating or mitigating circumstances. Id at 270-72. In Jurek, the defendant was sentenced to
death after being convicted of the kidnapping, forcible rape, and murder of a ten year old girl.
Id at 264-68. The Court found that the Texas statute required a separate proceeding to deter-
mine the sentence after a Texas jury has found a defendant guilty of one of the laws relating to
capital punishment. Id at 269 (citing TEX. CODE CR1M. PROC., art. 37.071(b) (Supp. 1975-
1976) (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. Paoc. ANN., art. 37.071(b),(c) (Vernon 1981))).
The Texas statute provides that the jurors are required to answer yes or no to the following
three questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.07 1(b). The State imposes a death sentence if the jury
finds that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt these three specific factors, which
imply that at least one aggravating circumstance exists. Id. art. 37.07 1(e). The State sentences
the defendant to life imprisonment if the jury finds that no aggravating circumstance can be
implied. Id. A "yes" answer may be given only if all jurors agree. Id. art. 37.071(d)(1). A
"no" answer may be given if 10 of 12 jurors agree. Id art. 37.071(d)(2). Although Texas,
unlike Georgia and Florida, had not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances, the
Court found that its method of narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence
could ever be imposed served the same basic purpose. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270. Texas' method
required the sentencing authority to focus on the particular circumstances surrounding the
crime. Id at 271. Similarly, although the Texas statute did not explicitly speak of mitigating
circumstances, the Court reasoned that requiring the State to prove the three factors listed
above allowed the jury to consider particularized mitigating factors about the defendant's
character. Id at 272-73. Thus, the Court affirmed the defendant's death sentence. Id at 277.
103. See Note, supra note 79, at 1701-08.
104. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 12. For example, Califor-
nia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Wyoming, Louisiana, and Mississippi enacted new mandatory death
penalties for certain types of homicide shortly after Furman was decided, while Delaware and
North Carolina returned to their prior practice of mandatory capital punishment by simply
removing all discretionary aspects from their statutes. Id
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states adopted mandatory death penalties for certain crimes.' North Caro-
lina, for example, amended its capital punishment statute in response to
Furman by !Teplacing discretionary sentencing with mandatory death
sentences. 106
In later cases, the Court made clear that Furman did not command such a
limited application. When challenged, the United States Supreme Court
voided four mandatory death sentences in Woodson v. North Carolina, '"
holding that the "respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment '' l 8 required both the capital offender's character and the circum-
stances surrounding the offense to be considered before imposing the death
penalty. "
In Woodson, four individuals were sentenced to death for participating in
the armed robbery of a convenience store, which resulted in the death of the
store's cashier." 0 The Court rejected the North Carolina statute because,
rather than taking into account "'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society,' ""' the statute indiscriminately
imposed a death sentence upon every person convicted of the specified of-
fense. 2 Noting that American juries had repeatedly refused to convict de-
fendants charged with first degree murder where the death sentence
105. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Before Furman was de-
cided, North Carolina law provided that the jury had unbridled discretion to decide whether
the convicted capital defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Id. at
299-300 (plurality opinion). After Furman, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
the portion of the death penalty statute which gave the jury the option of returning a guilty
verdict for first degree murder without imposing capital punishment was unconstitutional.
State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 444-45, 194 S.E.2d 19, 28 (1973); see Woodson, 428 U.S. at
300; see also Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 446-48, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116-18, 134
Cal. Rptr. 650, 666-67 (1976) (en banc) (Clark, J., concurring) (describing how California and
other states responded to Furman by enacting mandatory death penalty statutes).
106. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 299-300.
107. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
108. Id at 304 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 282-84.
111. Id. at 301 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101); see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
198 (1971) (discussing the creation of discretionary sentencing, which resulted from what the
Court called an American "rebellion against ... mandatory death sentence[s]") (1972). The
Furman Court agreed that America had rejected mandatory capital punishment. See Furman,
408 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 297-98 (Brennan, J., concurring);
id at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); id at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., with whom Blackmun, Pow-
ell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, dissenting); id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
statutes requiring automatic death penalties for certain crimes would be "regressive and of an
antique mold").
112. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287. Woodson, however, did not involve a mandatory death
penalty statute limited to a narrow category of crime, such as murder by a prisoner sentenced
to life imprisonment. Thus, the Court stated that it expressed no opinion regarding the consti-
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automatically resulted, 1 3 the Court found that North Carolina's mandatory
death penalty statute' 14 failed to uphold societal values illustrated in legisla-
tive enactments'1 5 and jury determinations."' The Court set aside the death
sentences, reasoning that North Carolina had misinterpreted Furman.""
According to the Woodson Court, Furman held that arbitrary jury discretion
must be replaced with objective and consistent standards to guide the impo-
sition of death sentences;" 8 Furman did not require that all defendants con-
victed of the same offense be sentenced to death without regard for the
circumstances of the offense and the character of the offender." 9  Finding
that North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute failed to guide the
jury sufficiently in exercising its power to decide which capital defendants
tutionality of such a statute. Id. n.7. This issue was settled eleven years later in Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
113. Woodson 428 U.S. at 289-93; see supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
114. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286. The Court quoted North Carolina's post-Furman death
penalty statute:
"A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprison-
ment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be
murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death."
Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975)).
115. Id. at 293. Both the United States Congress and state legislatures have responded to
jurors' aversion to mandatory capital punishment. Prior to Furman, only one state had re-
turned to automatic death penalty schemes after adopting discretionary sentencing. Iii at 294-
97 & n.30. Moreover, "it seems evident that the post-Furman enactments reflect attempts by
the States to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the Constitution, rather than a
renewed societal acceptance of mandatory death sentencing." Id. at 298.
116. Id. at 293; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (finding that "[t]he contemporary rarity of the infliction of [capital] punishment is... the
end result of a long-continued decline").
117. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03 (concluding that although mandatory death penalty stat-
utes may result in more death sentences, they do not satisfy Furman's requirement that arbi-
trary jury discretion be replaced with objective standards to guide and regulate the imposition
of capital punishment).
118. Id at 303.
119. Id at 303-04.
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record
of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compas-
sionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It
treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the
blind infliction of the penalty of death.
Id at 304.
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shall live and which shall die, the Court held the North Carolina statute
unconstitutional under Furman. 
120
The Supreme Court, in Sumner v. Shuman, 121 restated that mandatory
death penalty statutes violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 122 In
Sumner, the defendant was sentenced to death under a Nevada statute en-
acted shortly after Furman. 12 3 Nevada's mandatory capital sentencing stat-
ute eliminated discretionary sentencing by precluding the sentencer from
determining whether any relevant mitigating circumstances existed that
might justify imposing a lesser sentence.124 The defendant in Sumner, a
prison inmate serving a life sentence without possibility of parole, was con-
victed of first degree murder. 1 25 Only two elements had to be established at
the time of trial to support a guilty verdict for capital murder: first, that the
defendant had been convicted of murder while in prison; and second, that
the defendant had been convicted of an earlier criminal offense which, at the
time committed, resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment without possibil-
120. Id. at 302-05. For almost identical reasons, the Court struck down Louisiana's death
penalty statute in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), a case decided the same day as
Woodson. In Roberts, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder for killing a gas
station attendant during an armed robbery of a gas station. Id at 327-28. Like North Caro-
lina, Louisiana had responded to the Supreme Court's Furman decision by replacing discre-
tionary capital sentencing with mandatory death sentences. Id at 328-31. Under the revised
Louisiana statute, all persons found guilty of first-degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated
kidnapping, or treason were automatically sentenced to death. Id at 331. Moreover, where a
guilty verdict was returned, any jury qualification or recommendation of mercy was deemed
irrelevant. Id Thus, the Court reasoned, Louisiana's capital sentencing procedure actually
invited jurors to disregard their oaths and return a verdict for a less serious offense whenever
they felt that death was an inappropriate punishment for a particular defendant. Id at 334-35.
Finding that similar offenses do not always call for identical punishments, the Court held
unconstitutional, in light of changing societal standards, Louisiana's failure to consider the
personal character of the offender and the circumstances of the particular offense. Id. at 333-
34. Additionally, the Court concluded that merely narrowing the scope of the capital offense
and imposing death for limited categories of crime did not cure the unconstitutionality of
mandatory sentencing. Id. at 334-35. The Court held that, like North Carolina, Louisiana did
not fulfill Furman's basic requirement that arbitrary jury discretion be replaced with objective
standards to guide, regulate, and allow for the rational review of the imposition of capital
punishment. Id. at 335-36 (citing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303). Thus, the Court set aside the
defendant's death sentence. Id at 336.
121. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
122. Id at 77-78.
123. Id. at 70-71.
124. See id. at 78.
125. Id. at 67. Prior to Sumner, the Court had refrained from ruling on the constitutional-
ity of a mandatory death penalty statute applied to life-term inmates. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 n.11 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (plurality




ity of parole.12 6 Upon the jury's finding that these two elements existed, the
trial judge automatically imposed a death sentence.
127
The Court vacated the sentence, concluding that mandatory death penalty
statutes were unconstitutional because "the fundamental respect for human-
ity underlying the Eighth Amendment require[d] that the defendant be able
to present any relevant mitigating evidence that could justify a lesser sen-
tence."' 12' Thus, while Furman required a more uniform application of capi-
tal punishment, the Court has simultaneously required that the sentencer
consider case-specific criteria when assessing whether to inflict death upon a
particular defendant. 2 9 In the years following Furman, the Court at-
tempted to balance the competing interests of a capital defendant's right to
individualized sentencing, 3 ' with the constitutional requirement that the
death penalty be imposed in a rational and consistent manner.' 3 ' The Court
struck down the mandatory capital sentencing statutes in Woodson and
Sumner because, by not allowing mitigating evidence to be presented, North
Carolina and Nevada failed to treat capital defendants as unique human be-
ings. 132 In contrast, the Court upheld the guided-discretion statutes in
Gregg and Proffitt because they allowed the sentencer to consider relevant
mitigating evidence surrounding both the offense and the individual of-
fender.' 3 3 Thus, a new constitutional requirement appeared to emerge in
these cases: while capital sentencing must be governed by statutory gui-
dance under Furman, it must also be "humane and sensible to the unique-
ness of the individual."'
134
B. Lockett v. Ohio's Individualized Sentencing Through Mitigating
Circumstances
Although the Supreme Court struck down the mandatory death penalty
statute in Woodson, 135 the plurality neither articulated the types of mitigat-
126. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 78.
127. IAt
128. Id. at 85.
129. See supra notes 90-91, 107-09 and accompanying text.
130. A defendant receives individualized sentencing where the sentencer considers the rele-
vant aspects of the defendant's character and the nature of the offense alleged. In particular,
the sentencer must consider any and all mitigating circumstances which are outlined in the
state statute, as well as those which are not. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Rob-
erts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977).
131. Supra notes 13-15, 75-77 and accompanying text.
132. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 74-75; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
133. Supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
134. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
135. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
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ing evidence the sentencer should consider, nor indicated how the factors
should be considered. 
136
Confronted with these questions in Lockett v. Ohio, 137 the Court held that
in all but the rarest capital cases,' 31 the eighth and fourteenth amendments
require that the sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigat-
ing factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sen-
tence less than death."' 139 The Court pronounced that the state must pro-
mulgate guidelines that enable the sentencer to look at any relevant
mitigating factors, rather than an exclusive list of mitigating factors, when
deciding whether to impose the death penalty.'" Lockett's requirement of
individualized sentencing, however, made Furman's requirement of uniform
sentencing through limited sentencer discretion impossible to achieve.
The defendant in Lockett was sentenced to death because of her participa-
tion in the armed robbery of a pawnshop, which resulted in the death of the
shop's operator.14 1 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the death sen-
tence and remanded the case for further proceedings. 42 The Ohio statute at
issue in Lockett provided that a defendant found guilty of aggravated mur-
der based on at least one of seven specified aggravating circumstances re-
ceived a mandatory death sentence unless the defense established at least one
of the statutorily enumerated mitigating circumstances 43 by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.'" The Court concluded that a limitation on the types
of mitigating circumstances the sentencing authority may consider violated
136. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
137. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
138. Id at 604. In a footnote, the Lockett Court declared that it expressed no opinion as to
whether a mandatory death sentence would be justified for certain types of homicide such as
murder committed by a prisoner or escapee already under a life sentence. Id at 604 n. 11; see
supra note 125.
139. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis omitted). In a footnote, however, the Court stated
that its opinion should not be understood as a limitation on a court's authority to exclude from
consideration irrelevant evidence not relating to the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense. Id at 604 n.12.
140. Id at 604-08.
141. Id. at 589-94.
142. Id at 608-09.
143. Id at 607 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Anderson 1975) (codified
as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)-(C) (Anderson (1987)))).
144. Id The Court listed the three mitigating circumstances in Ohio's statute:
1. The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
2. It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that
the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
3. The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental defi-
ciency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
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the eighth and fourteenth amendments.' 45 In reaching this conclusion, the
plurality first noted that although individualized sentencing was not consti-
tutionally required, it had long been accepted.'" Next, the Court noted that
the plurality opinion in Woodson had found that the "'fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment' " required both the capital
offender's character and record, as well as the circumstances surrounding
the particular offense, to be a "'constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.' ,,147 Finally, after comparing the
narrowly worded Ohio statute with the broadly worded statutes previously
upheld in Gregg and Proffitt, "" the plurality declared that in limiting the
factors the sentencer could consider, Ohio created an unconstitutional risk
that death would be imposed where a less severe penalty was appropriate.
149
Thus, Lockett cemented a second constitutional requirement in the Court's
capital punishment jurisprudence: A death penalty statute must not pre-
clude the sentencer from considering any relevant mitigating factors when
deciding whether to impose life imprisonment or death.' 50
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 5' a majority of the Court accepted the Lockett
plurality's holding and implicitly criticized the uniformity mandated in
Furman by declaring that "a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences [was] a false consistency."1"2 The defendant in Eddings was sen-
tenced to death after being convicted of the first degree murder of a police
officer.' 53 The Court vacated the defendant's death sentence, holding that a
state's death penalty statute must allow the sentencer to consider any miti-
gating factor, and that the sentencer may not refuse to consider any relevant
mitigating evidence.' 54 Thus, the Court held that, although the sentencer
could decide how much weight to give a relevant mitigating factor, he could
not decide to ignore potentially mitigating evidence.' 5 Noting that the
Oklahoma statute at issue in Eddings allowed the defendant to proffer any
145. Id. at 608.
146. Id at 602 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949)).
147. Id at 604 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
148. Id at 607.
149. Id. at 605.
150. Id at 608.
151. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
152. Id. at 112.
153. Id at 105-09.
154. Id at 113-14.
155. Id at 114-15.
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mitigating circumstances as evidence,' 56 the Court declared that the sen-
tencer's failure to consider mitigating factors violated LocketL -7
Accordingly, in order for a state's death penalty statute to satisfy the
eighth and fourteenth amendments under Supreme Court analysis, the stat-
ute must satisfy two somewhat conflicting principles. While Furman and
Gregg require state legislatures to focus and guide sentencer discretion,'"5
the Woodson-Lockett line of cases insists that the sentencer be given broad
discretion to determine the mitigating force of all the circumstances of each
case. 159
Unable to resolve this paradox, commentators have criticized the Court's
efforts to rid the capital punishment system of arbitrary and capricious sen-
tencing."m The line between society's right to consistent application of the
death penalty and the defendant's right to individualized sentencing must be
drawn somewhere. In Walton v. Arizona,"6 the Supreme Court was given
the opportunity to draw this line.
11. WALTON v. ARIZONA: THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING THE
SENTENCING OF CAPITAL DEFENDANTS CONTINUES
On May 14, 1973, Arizona became the fourteenth state in the country to
revise its capital punishment scheme in response to Furman. 162 Arizona's
new legislation expanded the definition of first degree murder 63 and re-
156. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1980) (codified with some differences in
language at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 1991)).
157. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 & n.10. Five years later, the Supreme Court further upheld
the notion of individualized sentencing by unanimously invalidating a defendant's death sen-
tence because the advisory jury was told not to consider, and the sentencing judge explicitly
refused to consider, the non-statutory mitigating factors offered as evidence. Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
158. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3060-61 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
159. Id at 3061-63; Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Considera-
tion of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 438-39 (1990).
160. See Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 305, 354 (1984); Zimring &
Hawkins, A Punishment in Search of a Crime: Standards for Capital Punishment in the Law of
Criminal Homicide, 46 MD. L. REV. 115, 126-28 (1986).
[T]he Court has asked virtually nothing of the states that they were not doing before
Furman .... It is as if the constitutional strictures on the death penalty are merely a
matter of legal aesthetics. The state will satisfy the Court if it can describe its penalty
scheme according to some rational-looking form-indeed some metaphor of rational
form.
Weisberg, supra, at 354.
161. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
162. See Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 138, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 966-73; Poulos, Liability
Rulesx Sentencing Factors, and the Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 643, 723 (1990).
163. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105; supra note 32.
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placed unbridled sentencing discretion with the capital sentencing procedure
adopted by the Model Penal Code." ' Thus, guided by statute, an Arizona
trial judge is the sole sentencing authority. 165 After finding a defendant
guilty of first degree murder, 1 the judge conducts a separate sentencing
hearing to determine whether the sentence should be death or life imprison-
ment.167 This hearing has three stages. First, the prosecution must try to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more aggravating
circumstances.16 s Second, if the judge finds that such aggravating circum-
stances exist, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the existence of any mitigating circumstances. 69 Third, the court must
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circum-
stances.'17 The judge then returns a special verdict setting forth his findings
as to each of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 71 If he finds
that one or more of the enumerated aggravating circumstances exists, and
does not find any mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to warrant
leniency, the judge must impose a death sentence.172
In February 1989, an Arizona jury tried and convicted Jeffrey Walton for
the first degree murder of Thomas Powell.173 After the trial judge found
that Walton had committed the murder in an "especially heinous, cruel or
depraved" manner, that he had done so for pecuniary gain, and that no miti-
gating circumstances existed which were sufficiently substantial to warrant
164. See State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 53-54, 659 P.2d 1, 12-13, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971
(1983) (en banc). Arizona followed the "alternative formulation" method of the Model Penal
Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1980). In this formulation, the trial judge is the
sole sentencing authority. Id,
165. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 138, § 5, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 968-69; see Poulos, supra
note 162, at 724.
166. See supra note 32.
167. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B); see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
168. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C).
169. Id "The Arizona Supreme Court has construed the statute to require that any miti-
gating circumstances must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." Walton v. Ari-
zona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3071 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing State v. McMurtrey, 143
Ariz. 71, 73, 691 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1984) (en banc)).
170. ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E). "In determining whether to impose a sentence
of death or life imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis.., the court shall take
into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances . . . ." Id
171. Id. § 13-703(D).
172. Id. § 13-703(E).
173. See State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 576, 769 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1989) (en banc), aff'd,
110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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leniency, the trial judge sentenced Walton to death, 174 and the Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed.
75
Before the United States Supreme Court, Walton contended that the Ari-
zona death penalty statute was unconstitutional under four alternative theo-
ries: first, it allowed a judge rather than a jury to find facts prescribing a
death sentence; 176 second, it prevented the consideration of all mitigating
circumstances by requiring that mitigating circumstances first be proved by
a preponderance of the evidence; 177 third, the statute imposed an unconstitu-
tional presumption of death;17 ' and fourth, the statute contained the vague
"especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance language
that failed to guide adequately the sentencer's decision-making. 179 In es-
sence, Walton argued that under Arizona's statute the sentencer had unbri-
dled discretion because the statutory language defining aggravating
circumstances was unconstitutionally vague. On the other hand, Walton as-
serted that the sentencer had too little discretion because the statute pre-
cluded the sentencer from considering mitigating factors which Walton had
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the Walton Court
had full opportunity to confront the Furman-Lockett dichotomy.
A. The Majority's Rationale: The Furman-Lockett Tension Remains
Unresolved
Although the Furman-Lockett conflict was before the Court in Walton,
the majority did not acknowledge it. Instead, the majority rendered an opin-
ion narrowly tailored to Walton's criticisms of the Arizona statute."' 0 Jus-
tice White, writing for the majority, first found that the fact that a judge,
rather than a jury, was statutorily directed to make factual findings relating
to mitigating or aggravating circumstances did not render Arizona's death
penalty statute unconstitutional.' 8 ' Moreover, the majority rejected Wal-
174. Walton, 159 Ariz. at 576, 769 P.2d at 1022; see supra notes 32-40 and accompanying
text.
175. Walton, 159 Ariz. at 592, 769 P.2d at 1038; see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying
text.
176. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3054 (1990).
177. Id. at 3055.
178. Id at 3056.
179. Id at 3056-57.
180. Id at 3054-58.
181. Id. at 3054-55 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1446 (1990) (holding
that the Constitution does not require a jury to impose a death sentence or make the findings
leading to its imposition)); see Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (holding that
the sixth amendment does not require a jury to make specific findings for death sentences).
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ton's contention that aggravating factors are "elements of the offense" ' 2 in
Arizona, thereby requiring the assistance of a jury's determinations.
Walton also failed to persuade the Court that the Arizona statute was
unconstitutional because it imposed on defendants the burden of establish-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."8 3 Noting that the
Lockett Court itself refrained from expressing whether "'it violate[d] the
Constitution to require defendants to bear the risk of nonpersuasion as to the
existence of mitigating circumstances in capital cases,' " 'the majority held
that states were free to specify how mitigating circumstances were to be
proved.' 8 5 Moreover, the Court noted that the statute did not violate Wal-
ton's constitutional rights by requiring him to prove mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency, because the state fully
retained its burden of proving the existence of aggravating circumstances."8 6
Relying on recent Supreme Court precedent,'8 7 the majority also found
that Arizona's death penalty statute did not create an unconstitutional pre-
sumption that death was the proper sentence merely because the Arizona
statute required the court to impose the death penalty upon a finding of one
or more aggravating circumstances not counterbalanced sufficiently by miti-
gating circumstances.'88 In addition, the majority concluded that the death
sentence under Arizona's statute was not unconstitutionally mandatory in
182. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3054-55 (relying on Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986)
(holding that aggravating circumstances are merely standards to guide the decision between a
death sentence or life imprisonment, rather than separate penalties or offenses)).
183. Id at 3055-56.
184. Id at 3055 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 n.16 (1978)).
185. Id Justice Scalia, although concurring in part, did not join in the majority's discus-
sion of Lockett v. Ohio. See infra notes 198-223 and accompanying text.
186. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3055. The Court relied on several cases: Martin v. Ohio, 480
U.S. 228, 233-36 (1987) (upholding Ohio's method of imposing on a capital defendant the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she was acting in self-defense when
the murder was committed); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1977) (requiring a
defendant to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponder-
ance of the evidence); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) (requiring the defense of
insanity to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by a capital defendant).
187. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1083 (1990) (holding that because the
Pennsylvania statute did not prevent the sentencer from considering any type of mitigating
evidence, "[t]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases [was] satisfied by
allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence"); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct.
1190, 1196 (1990) (noting that because there was no constitutional mandate that juries have
unrestrained sentencing discretion, "[s]tates are free to structure and shape consideration of
mitigating evidence 'in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the
death penalty' ") (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (plurality opinion) (1988)).
188. Walton 110 S. Ct. at 3056.
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light of Woodson and Sumner because it was not automatically imposed
upon defendants convicted of certain types of murder."5 9
Finally, the majority held that although Arizona's "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance language was facially vague, 190
the Arizona Supreme Court's gloss on the statutory language sufficiently
narrowed the definition to pass constitutional muster. The Arizona Supreme
Court had provided that "'a crime is committed in an especially cruel man-
ner when the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the
victim's death,' "191 and "a crime is committed in an especially 'depraved'
manner when the perpetrator 'relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or
perversion,' or 'shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evi-
dences a sense of pleasure' in the killing."' 92 In support of its holding that
the language was limited, the majority noted that Arizona's construction
was similar to the construction of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravating circumstance the Court had previously approved in Prof-
fitt v. Florida. 1
93
Based on its presumption that Arizona trial judges apply the law in mak-
ing their decisions,' 94 the majority refused to analyze previous Arizona
Supreme Court decisions to determine whether the judge who sentenced
Walton to death had limited the construction of the aggravating factor in a
constitutional way.9'9 Thus, the majority concluded that Walton's death
sentence was not "'wantonly and freakishly' imposed,"'1 96 in violation of
Supreme Court precedent. 9
B Justice Scalia's Concurrence: Sacrificing Lockett For Furman
While the majority refused to address the Furman-Lockett conflict, Justice
Scalia directly confronted the question of whether Lockett and Furman can
coexist.' 9 Walton's argument, Justice Scalia reasoned, required the Court
189. Id; see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
190. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057.
191. Id
192. Id at 3058 (quoting State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 587, 769 P.2d 1017, 1033 (1989),
aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990)).
193. I ; see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976).
194. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057. "If the Arizona Supreme Court has narrowed the defini-
tion of the 'especially heinous, cruel or depraved' aggravating circumstance, we presume that
Arizona trial judges are applying the narrower definition." Id
195. Id. at 3058 (declining to challenge the proportionality review of the Arizona Supreme
Court as erroneous, after concluding that the challenged factor "ha[d] been construed by the
Arizona courts in a manner that furnishe[d] sufficient guidance to the sentencer").
196. Id (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987)).
197. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
198. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3058-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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to address the Furman-Lockett tension because the petitioner complained
that the sentencer had too much discretion and, simultaneously, too little
discretion to impose a death sentence. 199 Justice Scalia reasoned that, be-
cause the question of whether to impose life imprisonment or the death pen-
alty is a unitary one, holding that a sentencer has both too much and, at the
same time, too little discretion' is paradoxical. Yet, Justice Scalia recog-
nized, that paradox is precisely what Furman and Lockett, taken together,
mandate.2°1 Accordingly, although Justice Scalia concurred with the judg-
ment and most of the majority's reasoning, he wrote separately to demon-
strate that Lockett should yield to Furman. 2 2
Justice Scalia first reviewed Furman, Lockett and the subsequent cases
interpreting those decisions.20 3 Furman, Justice Scalia found, has always
stood for the constitutional principle that the sentencer's discretion must be
channeled and guided when determining whether to impose a death sen-
tence. 2°4 Alternatively, Justice Scalia acknowledged that Lockett requires
that the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.2"5 Thus, while the former principle constrains the sentencer's discre-
tion to impose the death penalty, the latter principle forbids constraints on
the sentencer's discretion to decline to impose capital punishment.2"
Justice Scalia found that the plurality decision in Lockett, which a major-
ity of the Court later adopted in Eddings, had no basis in Furman. 207 The
curtailment of discretion stressed in Furman, Justice Scalia noted, was all
but prohibited in Lockett, which required that a sentencer conduct an un-
constrained evaluation of both the offender and the offense before sentencing
a defendant to death."° This latter principle, Justice Scalia reasoned, had
199. Id at 3058.
200. Id at 3058-59.
201. Id. at 3059-64.
202. Id. at 3059.
203. Id at 3059-64.
204. Id at 3060-61; Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988).
205. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3061-63 (Scalia, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
206. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3062 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. Id. "In short, the practice which in Furman had been described as the discretion to
sentence to death and pronounced constitutionally prohibited, was in Woodson and Lockett
renamed the discretion not to sentence to death and pronounced constitutionally required."
Id
208. Id at 3063; see Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2951 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(stating that "so long as the class of murderers subject to capital punishment is narrowed,
there is no constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a jury to recommend mercy
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allowed states to impose only the most minimal constraints on the sen-
tencer's discretion" 9 because Supreme Court precedent forbids states from
creating exclusive lists of mitigating circumstances."' Finding that Lock-
ett's requirement destroys the uniformity, predictability, and stability that
Furman mandates, Justice Scalia turned to the text of the Constitution to
determine which principle should be followed.211
Justice Scalia first noted that the Framers had intentionally drafted the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment in the con-
junctive.21 2 Thus, he reasoned, even if a penalty was considered cruel, it
could not be said to violate the eighth amendment unless it was also found to
be unusual.21 3 Moreover, finding that the procedural aspects of capital sen-
tencing were controlled by the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments only insofar as cruel punishments were inflicted in
an arbitrary manner,214 Justice Scalia held that when a state adopts a non-
mandatory capital sentencing scheme, the sentencer's discretion must be
governed, in advance, by objective standards.2" 5
Justice Scalia then analyzed the Woodson-Lockett line of cases in light of
the eighth amendment, finding that they bore no relation to the text of the
Constitution.216 Justice Scalia found that imposing mandatory death
sentences, devoid of sentencer discretion, for crimes that states have tradi-
tionally punished with death, could not possibly violate the eighth amend-
ment because such a sentence would be neither cruel nor unusual.217 Justice
based on the mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant." (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 199 (1976)).
209. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3062 (Scalia, J., concurring).
210. Id.; see, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987) (petitioner was a loving
uncle, had been raised in poverty, and had lost his father to cancer); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 107 (1982) (defendant's parents were divorced when he was a young child, and until
he became a teenager, he had lived with his mother without rules or supervision).
211. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring). "[I]t is time for us to reexamine
our efforts in this area and to measure them against the text of the constitutional provision on
which they are purportedly based." Id
212. Id
213. Id.
214. Id.; Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to
the process by which it is imposed.").
215. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3066-67 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 (1988)).
216. Id at 3067.
217. Id. "It is quite immaterial that most States have abandoned the practice of automati-
cally sentencing to death all offenders guilty of a capital crime, in favor of a separate procedure
in which the sentencer is given the opportunity to consider the appropriateness of death in the
individual case." Id Justice Scalia found it even less relevant that "mandatory capital sen-
tencing is (or alleged to be) out of touch with 'contemporary community values' regarding the
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Scalia rejected the argument that mandatory capital sentencing schemes
would necessarily increase the jury nullification which had plagued absolute
discretionary schemes.2"' He found that if juries would ignore their instruc-
tions in mandatory schemes, there is no reason to believe that they would
not do the same with the legislatively guided standards that Furman
requires.219
Finally, even the doctrine of stare decisis did not prevent Justice Scalia
from declaring that he would no longer vote to uphold an eighth amendment
claim that the sentencer's discretion had been unconstitutionally re-
stricted.22 0 Justice Scalia argued that upholding Woodson-Lockett did noth-
ing to promote predictability, certainty, and stability in the law, or to protect
the expectations of those who have relied on existing rules, the objects of the
stare decisis doctrine.22' In fact, Justice Scalia believed that the Woodson-
Lockett line of caselaw had actually frustrated the Court's goal of obtaining
a rational, consistent, and uniform scheme of capital punishment,222 and had
only resulted in confusion among states as to what is constitutionally re-
quired under the eighth amendment.223
C. Justice Blackmun's Rationale: Arizona's Death Penalty Statute Found
Unconstitutional
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, found that the Arizona death pen-
alty statute violated Supreme Court precedent for three reasons.224 First, he
found that Arizona's statute, which allowed the sentencer to consider only
those mitigating circumstances proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
prevented individualized sentencing under Lockett.22' Second, Justice
Blackmun argued that the requirement that the defendant bear the burden of
establishing mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to warrant leni-
ency imposed an unconstitutional presumption of death on capital defend-
ants in Arizona. 226 Third, he contended that the "especially heinous, cruel
or depraved" aggravating circumstance, as construed by the Arizona
administration of justice." Ia. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976)




221. Id. at 3068.
222. Id.
223. Id
224. Id at 3070 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
225. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3070-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 3075-76.
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Supreme Court, provided no meaningful guidance to the sentencer in viola-
tion of Furman.227
Justice Blackmun objected to the majority's failure to explain how the
Arizona statute, which precluded the sentencer from considering all mitigat-
ing circumstances that the defendant had not been able to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, could be reconciled with the constitutional
principles established in Lockett.22 8  Noting that the "'qualitative differ-
ence' "229 between death and all other punishments required the greatest de-
gree of reliability, Justice Blackmun found that constitutional standards
could be satisfied only if defendants were allowed to present relevant mitigat-
ing evidence in an unrestricted manner.230 Justice Blackmun asserted that
the Arizona statute prohibited judges from weighing mitigating evidence
proffered by the defendant when the judges believed that the evidence was
not mitigating enough. 23' Thus, he found that the Arizona statute pre-
vented the sentencer from considering certain potentially relevant mitigating
evidence, in violation of Lockett. 
232
Justice Blackmun also found that placing the burden of proving mitigating
circumstances that are "'sufficiently substantial to call for leniency' ,233 on
the defendant imposed an unconstitutional presumption of death because the
Arizona Supreme Court previously had held that a defendant's mitigating
227. Id. at 3081-82.
228. Id. at 3071.
229. Id. at 3070 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
230. Id at 3070-71. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's almost exclusive reliance on
noncapital cases, which allowed the state to place the burden of proving affirmative defenses
upon the defendant, when discussing this aspect of Arizona's death penalty scheme. Id at
3071-72; see supra note 186 and accompanying text. Noting that individualized sentencing
under Supreme Court analysis has never been analogized to cases outside the sphere of capital
sentencing, and given the fact "'that death is a punishment different from all other sanctions
in kind rather than degree,' "Justice Blackmun concluded that the majority's reliance on these
cases was both improper and misleading. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04).
231. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
232. "Mhe 'existence' of a mitigating factor frequently is not a factual issue to which a
'yes' or 'no' answer can be given." Id. at 3072 (citing Stebbing v. Maryland, 469 U.S. 900
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
To preclude the sentencer from considering such potentially influential evidence-as
does the statute by denying any weight to evidence if the defendant does not convince
the jury that a factor 'exists' by a preponderance of the evidence-is to bar, as a
matter of law, consideration of all mitigating evidence and influence and thus to
violate Lockett and Edding
Stebbing& 469 U.S. at 903 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989)).
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evidence met this test only where the mitigating factors " 'outweigh[ed]' "234
the aggravating factors.23 Moreover, because the statute required the trial
judge to impose death where the mitigating and aggravating factors are
found to be of equal weight,236 he argued that the eighth amendment's re-
quirement of a "'determination that death is the appropriate punish-
ment' ,,237 was violated.238
Finally, Justice Blackmun found that Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel
or depraved" aggravating circumstance language was unconstitutionally
vague, failing to guide and limit the sentencer's discretion as required by
Furman.239 He criticized the majority's failure to examine the Arizona
Supreme Court's application of the aggravating factor,2' and concluded
that if it had, the Court would have found that "there ... appear[ed] to be
few first-degree murders which the Arizona Supreme Court would not define
as especially heinous or depraved-and those murders which [did] fall
outside... [were] likely to be covered by some other aggravating factor."241
234. Id
235. Id; see State v. McCall, 160 Ariz. 119, 125, 770 P.2d 1165, 1171 (1989) (en banc),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3289 (1990); State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 208, 766 P.2d 59, 81 (1988)
(en banc).
236. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237. Id (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion)). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Walton concluded that the presumption of death inherent
in Arizona's statute was forbidden by the Constitution, as it allowed "doubtful cases" to fall on
the side of the death penalty. Id at 3076.
238. Id. at 3075. Justice Blackmun also found that the majority's reliance on Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990) and Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990) was
misplaced because the statutes upheld in those cases allowed a death sentence to be imposed
only where the aggravating circumstances were found to outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances, or where there were no mitigating circumstances. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3075 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
239. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3081-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text.
240. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241. Id at 3080 (emphasis in original). Justice Blackmun first noted that although various
Arizona cases had set forth definitions for "heinous," "cruel" and "depraved," they had done
so by using terms and phrases that were just as vague and broad. Id at 3078-80. Justice
Blackmun then cited to a plethora of Arizona Supreme Court cases to illustrate that Arizona's
"especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance language encompassed
nearly every type of homicide imaginable. Id; see State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 368, 728
P.2d 232, 238 (1986) (en banc) (victim was very young), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1011 (1987); Id.
at 368, 728 P.2d at 238 (killer had no motive for committing the murder); State v. Chaney, 141
Ariz. 295, 312, 686 P.2d 1265, 1282 (1984) (en banc) (defendant used little force, prolonging
victim's suffering); State v. Summerlin, 138 Ariz. 426, 436, 675 P.2d 686, 696 (1983) (en banc)
(defendant used more force than was necessary to kill victim); State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404,
430, 661 P.2d 1105, 1131 (en banc) (killer had a very strong motive, such as hatred or re-
venge), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 69, 659 P.2d 22, 28
(en banc) (victim was extremely old), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983). Justice Blackmun
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority's presumption that the trial judge
who sentenced the petitioner to death had been aware of the Arizona
Supreme Court's construction and interpretation of the aggravating circum-
stance. He criticized the majority, however, for failing to recognize that the
judge's knowledge of Arizona precedent was irrelevant because the prece-
dent was incapable of guiding the sentencer's discretion.2 42 Finding that
both the legislature and the Arizona Supreme Court had failed to narrow
sufficiently the application of the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved"
language, Justice Blackmun concluded that the defendants were sentenced to
death in an arbitrary and capricious manner.243
Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissent to espouse his view that the
death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment under all circumstances
because it "treats members of the human race as nonhumans. 2  Moreover,
Justice Brennan criticized Justice Scalia's dismissal of Lockett and its prog-
eny, 4 1 holding that if capital punishment is to exist, it must be not only
"'consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness
of the individual.' "24
Justice Stevens, who also joined in Justice Blackmun's dissent, wrote sepa-
rately that the sixth amendment requires a jury to determine the facts that
must be established prior to imposing the death penalty.2 47 Moreover, Jus-
tice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia's declaration that he would no longer
regard Woodson, Lockett, and cases adopting the reasoning of those deci-
sions as binding precedent. 248 Justice Stevens contended that it was proper
to reduce the risk of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty through the
use of statutory channeled guidance, while allowing the sentencer complete
discretion after considering the personal characteristics and circumstances of
individuals found eligible for the death sentence.249 In reaching his conclu-
sion, Justice Stevens relied on Zant v. Stephens, 250 an opinion that he had
authored seven years earlier.2"1 In Zant, the Court followed the Georgia
further found that the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "cruelty" had become so
broad that murders found "especially cruel" were typical rather than exceptional, as the aggra-
vating factor seemed to require only that the victim be conscious and aware of his danger for
some period before his death. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3081 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3081-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 3082.
244. Id. at 3068 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
245. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3069 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 3069 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)).
247. Id. at 3086 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 3089-90.
249. Id. at 3090.
250. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
251. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3090-91.
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Supreme Court's "pyramid" analysis to review Zant's death sentence. The
pyramid consists of three divisible planes.25 2 The first plane above the base
separates murder from all other homicide cases. 253 The second plane sepa-
rates from all murder cases those in which death is a possible punishment.254
This plane is established by statutory definitions of aggravating circum-
stances.255 With certain specified exceptions, a defendant does not move
above this plane unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance ex-
ists.256 The third plane separates those cases in which death shall be im-
posed from all cases in which it may be imposed.257 The factfinder has
absolute discretion to place any given case below this plane and not impose
death.258 The plane itself is established by the factfinder.259 Therefore, Jus-
tice Stevens argued, because the type of offense at the bottom of the pyramid
differs from those offenses catagorized at the apex of the pyramid, "[a] rule
that forbids unguided discretion at the base is completely consistent with the
one that requires discretion at the apex." Based on this analysis, Justice
Stevens disagreed with Justice Scalia's view that the question of life impris-
onment versus death is a unitary one.2"
III. A RETURN To A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL SCHEME
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
One of the goals of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause is to impose the death penalty in a rational, uniform, and nonarbitrary
manner. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Furman that this
goal could be achieved by requiring states to create statutory guidelines to
channel the sentencer's discretion when determining whether to impose
death or life imprisonment upon convicted murderers.2 6' A plurality of the
Court later held in Lockett, however, that the unique finality of execution
required that a sentencer have the discretion to impose a sentence less than
death, after considering relevant mitigating evidence proffered by the defend-
ant.262 Confusion among the states predictably resulted, as narrow discre-
252. Zant, 462 U.S. at 870-72.







260. Walton. 110 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note
200.
261. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 137-40.
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tion to impose death and broad discretion to impose life sentences are
inherently irreconcilable standards.263
In Walton v. Arizona, the Court had the opportunity to resolve this ten-
sion. The majority, however, failed to address or even acknowledge that the
tension exists. Rather, the majority focused solely on the validity of Ari-
zona's death penalty statute, finding that it satisfied "constitutional" require-
ments.264 The majority's failure to confront the tension surrounding
Furman and Lockett, the principal cases in the Court's eighth amendment
jurisprudence, has left the states with the same standard that existed prior to
Furman, specifically, because of the conflicting doctrines, no real standards
at all.
Justice Scalia forsaw the confusion likely to result from yet another
Supreme Court capital punishment case attempting to uphold the inconsis-
tent principles established in Furman and Lockett, and directly confronted
the underlying tension.26 Although Justice Scalia did not contend that the
Court's Woodson and Lockett cases were erroneous, he did find them irrec-
oncilable with the Court's Furman decision.2 66 Finding that Furman had a
basis in the text of the United States Constitution, while the Woodson-Lock-
ett line of cases did not,26 7 Justice Scalia decided to adhere to the former at
the latter's expense.268
Justice Scalia is correct that Furman has a strong basis in the Constitu-
tion. Imposing the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious fashion is
cruel and unusual, in violation of the eighth amendment. Furthermore, his
contention that Furman and Lockett cannot coexist is accurate, as the prin-
ciples they stand for are rationally irreconcilable. While Justice Scalia is
correct in urging the Court to address the Furman-Lockett tension, his open
dismissal of nearly two decades of eighth amendment jurisprudence by re-
jecting Lockett requires additional consideration. Neither a majority of the
Court nor a majority of the states is likely to accept the wholesale abandon-
ment of Lockett and its progeny given the respect states have for individual-
ized sentencing. 269 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's opinion may generate
enough attention to convince the Court that Furman and Lockett must be
263. Supra notes 204-06.
264. Supra notes 180-97.
265. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. ?)47, 3058-68 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
266. Id at 3067.
267. Id. at 3066-67.
268. Id. at 3067-68.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34, 145-46.
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reexamined together to give the states more rational and meaningful gui-
dance in the area of capital sentencing.
Justice Stevens' criticism of Justice Scalia's inability to understand the
concepts behind Furman and Lockett, 2 70 as well as the "pyramid" concept
of capital sentencing that Justice Stevens poses2 7' are unpersuasive. Justice
Stevens argued that forbidding unguided discretion in the initial stage of the
capital sentencing process is consistent with allowing complete, unrestrained
discretion to show mercy at the final stage. 2 This analysis, however, has
no basis in the Furman line of cases because once a statutory aggravating
circumstance is found, the sentencer has nothing to guide his decision to
impose life imprisonment or death.27 3 After the threshold finding of one
statutory aggravating circumstance is reached, that factor is entirely disre-
garded, and the sentencer is "left completely at large, with nothing to guide
[him] but [his] whims and prejudices. '2 74 Thus, Justice Stevens' "pyramid"
concept is simply a return, with the mere requirement of one statutory ag-
gravating circumstance, to the pre-Furman discretion which convinced the




In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has devoted much of its atten-
tion to the statutory schemes by which states sentence capital defendants to
death. When interpreting and analyzing these death penalty statutes, the
Court has tried to develop an objective and consistent method for imposing
capital punishment, while attempting to guarantee capital defendants the
right to subjective and individualized treatment. The decision in Walton v.
Arizona failed to further these goals. In upholding a state statute which fails
to distinguish those offenses for which death is an appropriate penalty from
those for which it is not, the majority violated Furman. Additionally, in
upholding a state statutewhich prevents the consideration of any mitigating
270. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. Id at 3090-92; supra text accompanying notes 249-60.
272. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). "If this Court's decisions concerning the death
penalty establish anything, it is that a capital sentencing scheme based on 'standardless jury
discretion' violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id at 905 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195-96 n.47 (1976)).
274. Id at 910.
275. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that the
Lockett rule, that the sentencer must consider any mitigating evidence proffered by the defend-
ant, represented an" 'about-face' " from Furman. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
622 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment)).
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circumstances not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the majority
violated Lockett.
The majority's failure to address the conflicting principles governing state
death penalty statutes and the narrow split between the Supreme Court jus-
tices in Walton v. Arizona are likely to further confuse, rather than resolve
the concerns of, state legislatures as to what is constitutionally required
when sentencing capital defendants to death. It is time for the Supreme
Court to analyze and reconcile its Furman and Lockett decisions, as Justice
Scalia did in his concurrence. As Supreme Court precedent exists now,
there is no rational and consistent standard to guide the imposition of the
death penalty. Respect for the eighth amendment surely requires more than
this.
Lori L. Nader
